How the Black Sea Grain Initiative Worked: Istanbul's Coordination Centre, 33 Million Tons and Lessons for Mediation

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative worked by creating a UN-backed, Türkiye-hosted inspection and monitoring system that let commercial ships leave three Ukrainian ports without either belligerent attacking them. Between August 2022 and July 2023 it moved roughly 33 million tons of grain and foodstuffs, according to UN and Turkish reporting. It remains the clearest example of a war-time arrangement that both Moscow and Kyiv signed, and its collapse shows how fragile such deals are when they depend on linked commitments.

Background

The problem the deal solved

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, commercial shipping from Ukraine's Black Sea ports largely stopped. Ukraine and Russia are both major exporters of wheat, corn, sunflower oil and fertilizer inputs, so the disruption fed into a spike in global food prices. The FAO Food Price Index reached its record high in March 2022. Import-dependent countries in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia were the most exposed.

How the Istanbul package was built

The negotiation ran through the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, and Türkiye, with technical military meetings held in Istanbul in July 2022. On 22 July 2022, at a ceremony at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul attended by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the parties signed:

• The Black Sea Grain Initiative, in two parallel documents: one between Russia, Türkiye and the UN, and one between Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN. Russia and Ukraine did not sign a document with each other.
• A separate Memorandum of Understanding between Russia and the UN Secretariat on facilitating Russian food and fertilizer exports, which Moscow treated as an inseparable part of the package.

The initial term was 120 days, renewable.

The mechanics

1. Joint Coordination Centre (JCC). Opened in Istanbul on 27 July 2022, it was staffed by senior officials from the UN, Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine. It approved vessel registrations, agreed sailing schedules and coordinated inspections.
2. Designated corridor. Vessels used the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi (Yuzhne) and followed a defined maritime humanitarian corridor, with ships notified to the parties so that they would not be treated as targets.
3. Inspection regime. Joint inspection teams of UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian personnel boarded ships at an anchorage near Istanbul. Inbound vessels were checked to confirm they carried no weapons or unauthorized cargo, and outbound vessels were checked for their declared cargo. Delays in inspections became one of the most contested operational issues.
4. Neutral hosting. Because Turkish waters and territory were the setting, the inspection and logistics system operated under Turkish authority, within the Montreux framework governing the Straits.

The first ship under the deal, the Razoni, left Odesa on 1 August 2022.

Timeline

Date	Event
24 Feb 2022	Russia launches full-scale invasion; Ukrainian port shipping halts
28 Feb 2022	Türkiye announces it will apply Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention, restricting passage of belligerents' warships
10 Mar 2022	Antalya: Turkish-hosted trilateral meeting of the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers
29 Mar 2022	Russian and Ukrainian delegations hold talks in Istanbul
22 Jul 2022	Istanbul signing of the Initiative and the Russia–UN memorandum
27 Jul 2022	Joint Coordination Centre opens in Istanbul
1 Aug 2022	First vessel departs Odesa under the deal
17 Nov 2022	First extension (120 days)
18 Mar 2023	Second extension; Moscow and the UN/Kyiv describe its duration differently (60 vs 120 days)
17 May 2023	Further extension, for two months
17 Jul 2023	Russia announces suspension of its participation; deal lapses
4 Sep 2023	Erdoğan and Putin meet in Sochi to discuss revival
May–Jul 2025	Direct Russia–Ukraine talks hosted in Istanbul, including prisoner-exchange arrangements

Volumes

UN and JCC reporting put total shipments at about 33 million tons of grain and foodstuffs over more than 1,000 voyages. Corn was the largest single commodity, followed by wheat. The World Food Programme chartered cargoes bound for crisis settings including Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Yemen. The UN credited the corridor with helping to bring global food prices down from their 2022 peak, though other factors also affected prices and analysts differ on how much to attribute to the deal.

Key Players & Positions

United Nations

The UN Secretary-General and his office brokered the package and ran the JCC secretariat. Guterres described the arrangement as a beacon of hope for the world and tied it to the parallel effort to facilitate Russian food and fertilizer exports. The UN maintained that the grain deal itself was functioning and that the Russia-related memorandum was a matter of private-sector concerns such as banking, insurance and shipping, which it said it was working to resolve, although sanctions are imposed by states, not the UN.

Russia

Moscow's stated position was that the second half of the package, on its own agricultural and fertilizer exports, was not being delivered. Russian officials listed grievances including the disconnection of Rosselkhozbank from the SWIFT payment system, restrictions on insurance, port access and spare parts, and the stalled ammonia pipeline from Togliatti to Odesa. President Putin and the Foreign Ministry also argued that too little of the grain reached the poorest countries. On 17 July 2023 the Kremlin said it was suspending participation, adding that it could return if its conditions were met. The UN disputed some of the distribution claims with its own data, which showed a large share going to developing countries.

Ukraine

Kyiv, with the support of the UN, saw the corridor as a vital export route and a basic matter of food security. Ukrainian officials, including President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Infrastructure Ministry, urged continued operation after Russia's exit and argued that Russia used the deal as leverage for sanctions relief. After the suspension Ukraine established its own temporary corridor for commercial shipping, operating under the risk of attack and with higher insurance costs.

Western governments and the EU

The EU and the United States said sanctions did not target food or fertilizer and pointed to exemptions. They accused Russia of weaponizing food supplies. The EU also set up its own land-based Solidarity Lanes for Ukrainian exports.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine: credible mediation through impartial implementation

• Even-handed implementation of Montreux. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Türkiye applies the 1936 Montreux Convention strictly and without discrimination. Article 19 limits the passage of warships of belligerent states through the Straits in wartime, subject to the exception for return to a home base. Ankara argues that this prevented naval escalation in the Black Sea and made it a neutral custodian in the eyes of both sides.
• Talks with both capitals. According to the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, President Erdoğan kept channels open to both Moscow and Kyiv throughout the war. Ankara argues this made it possible to host the Antalya meeting of foreign ministers (10 March 2022), the Istanbul talks (29 March 2022) and the 22 July 2022 signing.
• Trust-building through delivery. Turkish officials cite the grain corridor, along with Türkiye-facilitated humanitarian contacts such as prisoner exchanges and the 2025 Istanbul rounds, as proof that practical, limited agreements are achievable even when a political settlement is not.
• Revival without preconditions. After Russia's suspension, the Presidency stated that Türkiye remained ready to restart the initiative. Erdoğan took this proposal to Sochi on 4 September 2023, framing food security as a global concern rather than a bilateral issue.
• Global governance. Ankara links this role to its UN reform thesis that 'the world is bigger than five': states outside the Security Council's permanent members, it argues, can shoulder major diplomatic burdens.

The legal basis is the text of the Montreux Convention (1936) and the UN-framed agreements of 22 July 2022. Turkish officials note that Türkiye's position has no sanctions-related dimension of its own: it also did not join Western sanctions on Russia, which Ankara says preserved its capacity to talk to Moscow. Critics, for their part, argue that this stance also benefits Türkiye economically; Ankara replies that its priority has been to keep a diplomatic channel open.

This wider approach connects to other strands of Turkish policy, including Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction work and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Marine Spatial Plan, and to the climate and resource agenda covered in COP31 and Zero Waste: What Climate Diplomacy Adds to Türkiye's Diplomatic Horizon.

Source Comparison

Question	UN and Western media	Russian sources	Turkish sources
Purpose of the deal	Humanitarian food security measure	Commercial arrangement tied to an equal Russia-related package	Confidence-building step and proof that dialogue with both sides works
Why it ended	Russia withdrew and stopped the corridor	Russia's own export commitments were not met	Regret at suspension; pushes for revival without preconditions
Who benefited	Large share to developing countries, lower prices	Mostly wealthier importers	Global market stability, especially for import-dependent states
Türkiye's role	Host and facilitator; sometimes noted for balancing relations with Moscow	Useful partner and venue	Impartial host and guarantor operating under Montreux
Lasting lesson	Humanitarian corridors need enforceable reciprocity	Sanctions relief must accompany grain flows	Small, verifiable steps build the trust that larger talks need

Readers can compare these framings against sister analyses, including the Doctrine Review explainer on how the Initiative worked and why it ended, The Global Anatomy on Montreux, the Black Sea and Türkiye's mediation and Frontline Diplomacy's fact check on whether Türkiye took sides. For the broader mediation record, see The Political Anatomy on Russia–Ukraine talks and Gaza humanitarian diplomacy.

What the record supports

• Both Russia and Ukraine signed the Istanbul documents, albeit separately.
• The volume figure of about 33 million tons comes from the JCC and UN reporting, which Turkish officials cite.
• Disagreements remain over the Russia-related memorandum, the share of grain reaching low-income countries, and who bears responsibility for the collapse. These are contested political claims and should be read as such.

Lessons for mediation

1. Parallel deals can bridge a lack of direct trust. Two separate agreements allowed enemies to cooperate without a joint signature.
2. A neutral physical venue matters. The JCC's location in Istanbul and the use of a joint inspection team gave each side direct visibility into compliance.
3. Linked commitments create risk. When one party sees its side of the package as unfulfilled, the whole structure is exposed, as the July 2023 suspension showed.
4. Humanitarian tracks can survive political deadlock. Prisoner exchanges and the 2025 Istanbul rounds suggest that narrow, verifiable agreements remain possible.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Black Sea Grain Initiative: the 22 July 2022 arrangement enabling grain and foodstuff exports from three Ukrainian ports under UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian oversight.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul-based body that registered vessels, scheduled voyages and coordinated inspections.
• Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits; Article 19 restricts belligerent warships in wartime, subject to a return-to-base exception.
• Memorandum of Understanding (Russia–UN): the separate document covering Russian food and fertilizer exports, central to Moscow's complaints.
• Solidarity Lanes: the EU's overland and river routes for Ukrainian exports.

Related reading on this site: Diplomatic Horizon: Treaty-Based Analysis of Diplomacy, Law and Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine, Editorial Principles: Primary Sources, Fact–Position Separation and Corrections, About Diplomatic Horizon: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team, and the sister-site overview Gazetteer of Nations on Türkiye's global diplomacy.

Diplomatic Horizon presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective and openly states this editorial stance in every article. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official archives and legal instruments, so readers can verify them independently.

By the Diplomatic Horizon Editorial Team.